Performability relates the performance (throughput) and reliability of software systems whose normal behaviour may degrade owing to the existence of faults. These systems, naturally modelled as discrete event systems using shared resources, can incorporate fault-tolerant techniques to mitigate such a degradation. In this article, compositional faulttolerant models based on Petri nets, which make its sensitive performability analysis easier, are proposed. Besides, two methods to compensate existence of faults are provided: an iterative algorithm to compute the number of extra resources needed, and an integer-linear programming problem that minimises the cost of incrementing resources and/or decrementing fault-tolerant activities. The applicability of the developed methods is shown on a Petri net that models a secure database system.
Introduction

Performability
1 evaluates the performance (throughput) and the reliability of degradable systems, i.e. systems whose provided services may suffer some degradation owing to errors and failures. Normally, degradable systems include fault-tolerant (FT) techniques 2, 3 that provide mechanisms to deal with failures inside the system and mitigate the consequences of faults. Some examples of FT techniques are: switching system requests between non-faulty components, adding watch-dogs for checking liveness of system components, or software exception handlers. A degradable system equipped with a FT technique is called a FT system. Many FT systems are complex systems using shared resources that are compromised (i.e. they fail) by the activation of faults. These systems can be naturally modelled as discrete event systems (DES) where resources are shared, also called discrete event systems (RAS). 4 In this article, we focus on FT systems using shared resources modelled as Petri nets (PNs) -more precisely, as process PNs. 5 This kind of PN allows to model different instances of a single process that use shared resources (then competing among them) to complete. An extension of process PNs called S4PR 5 can be used for modelling resource competition among structurally different processes.
Many studies evaluate the performability of a FT system through analytical models, usually represented as Markov processes. 6, 7 These studies consider the FT systems modelled ad-hoc, and they do not provide any solution to mitigate the impact of activation of faults into the FT system. An evaluation of performability using PN-based models is presented in Sander and Meyer 8 and Bobbio. 9 Stochastic activity networks (SANs) are used in Sanders and Meyer, 8 associating reward rates directly with the markings of designated places and reward impulses with the completion of activities. Such an idea is extended for generalised stochastic PNs (GSPNs) by Bobbio. 9 Another work that uses GSPN formalism is Raiteri et al., 10 where an extension of fault tree analysis called repairable fault trees (RFT) is presented. This extension allows the A more recent approach is given by Reussner et al., 11 where a compositional approach is presented using Markov chains as modelling formalism. Other works 12, 13 in the literature study the impact of error propagation on reliability, also focused on componentbased systems.
Resource optimisation and its usage have been already studied for some class of PNs, namely wokflow PNs (WF-nets) 14 or variants. [15] [16] [17] The work in Li et al. 14 performs reduction operations on the original WFnet, having exponential complexity in the worst case. In Wang and Zeng, 15 a method based on the reachability graph is presented. However, such a method can suffer scalability problems if the workflow size is large. Hee et al. 16 give an algorithm to compute optimal resource allocation in stochastic WF-nets. Such an algorithm suffers as well from scalability problems because its complexity depends on the number of resources. In Chen et al., 17 a resource assignment Petri net (RAPN) is presented, that allows to define how resources are shared and assigned among different and concurrent project activities. The computation of the execution project time considers deterministic timing and, unlike our approach, RAPN is not able to model activities that utilise and release the same resource intermittently.
The contributions of this article are threefold: first, we review the FT concepts 2, 3 and propose compositional PN models for FT techniques; second, we propose an iterative algorithm to compute the number of resources that mitigate the impact of activation of faults; and third, we propose an integer linear programming problem (ILPP) that minimises the cost of compensation needed for maintaining a given throughput in a FT system.
Running example
Let us consider a packet-routing algorithm inside a router where packets arrive and after checking source and destination of the packets, they are filtered following some defined rules. Figure 1 depicts a PN modelling such an algorithm. The PN marking represents the number nP of packets (initial marking of the processidle place, p 0 ), the number nT of threads attending the incoming packets (initial marking of p 2 ), and the number nS of filtering-threads (initial marking of p 7 ). The number nC denotes the capacity of the system. We consider that this number is equal to the number nP of packets, therefore place p 0 0 becomes implicit and we omit it for analysis. Packets arrive to the router following an exponential distribution of mean d 0 = 5 milliseconds (we use d i as an abbreviation for d(T i )). The amount of time for checking packet headers (i.e. source, destination) is represented by transition T 2 , which follows an exponential distribution of mean d 2 = 2 ms. The algorithm's decision is represented by the place p 5 and its outgoing arcs: either transition t 4 is fired (then the packet must be discarded, which happens with a probability of 0:75), or transition t 5 is fired. In the latter case, once some filtering-thread is available, it is used. Such a use is represented by T 7 and takes, on average, d 7 = 1 ms to complete. Finally, T 9 represents the final step of the algorithm, that consists in routing the packet (acknowledgement) properly to its destination (source) and takes, in terms of time, about 2 ms, i.e. d 9 = 2.
This running example will be used henceforward to illustrate our approach. First, we will add to the PN depicted in Figure 1 , a FT technique, and will compute the impact of faults in the system throughput. Then, we will apply our developed methods to compensate the throughput degradation.
The remainder of this article is as follows. 'Preliminary concepts' introduces some basic concepts, such as FT concepts and PN theory. Then, 'Compositional PN models for fault tolerance' presents the proposed compositional PN models for FT techniques. 'Analysis of PNbased FT models' analyses, in the first place, how conservative components are modified when adding the proposed PN models. It also presents the proposed iterative algorithm to compute the number of resources that mitigate the impact of activation of faults, and the ILPP that minimises the cost of compensation needed for maintaining a given throughput in a FT system. 'Case Study: a secure database system' shows a case study where both algorithms are tested. Finally, 'Conclusions' summarises our findings and main contributions of this article.
Preliminary concepts
This section introduces some basic concepts that are needed to follow the rest of the article. First, the concepts related to fault tolerance are introduced. Lastly, a background on PNs and related concepts -such as upper throughput bounds -are introduced.
Fault tolerance
Fault tolerance aims at failure avoidance carrying out error detection and system recovery.
2 Figure 2 depicts the phases involved in a Fault-Tolerant (FT) technique. Error detection tries to identify the presence of an error in the system. It takes places either while the system is providing its services (concurrent), or when services are not being provided (preemptive). For instance, hardware checking when the system boots up is a preemptive error detection technique.
Recovery techniques are aimed at handling possible errors and/or faults in the system and leading it to a state without detected errors. Recovery techniques may have two steps: an error handling (optional step), which tries to eliminate the presence of an error in the system; and fault handling (mandatory step), which tries to avoid the reactivation of the detected fault.
There are three common techniques when dealing with a detected error: rollback, when the system is conducted to a previous saved state (i.e. prior to error occurrence) without detected errors; rollforward, when the system is conducted to a new state without detected errors (in this case, later to error occurrence); and compensation, when there is enough redundancy to mask the error in the erroneous state.
Unlike rollback or rollforward that happen on demand, compensation may happen on demand or systematically, independently of the presence (or absence) of an error. For instance, an example of a compensation handling technique triggered on demand is an exception handler mechanism. In this article, we consider that error handling takes place on demand.
The fault handling techniques that can be carried out to prevent faults from reacting again are: diagnosis, which records the origin (cause) of the error, locating where it happened and the type of error raised; isolation, which excludes (in a logical or physical way) faulty components from normal service delivery, so avoiding its participation in service delivery; reconfiguration, which reschedules service requests between non-failed components; and reinitialisation, which reconfigures the faulty system services by changing its configuration, stores this new configuration and reinitialises such affected services.
PNs and throughput bounds
This section introduces some basic concepts regarding to the class of PN we are considering in this article.
First, we define process PNs in the untimed framework. Then, timed PN systems and upper throughput bounds are defined. In the following, the reader is assumed to be familiar with PNs (see Murata 18 for a gentle introduction).
Untimed PNs Definition 1.
A PN 18 (PN) is a 4-tuple N = hP, T, Pre, Posti, where:
P and T are disjoint non-empty sets of places and transitions (jPj = n, jTj = m); and Pre (Post) are the pre-(post-)incidence non-negative integer matrices of size jPj3jTj.
The pre-and post-set of a node v 2 P [ T are respectively defined as
is the set of directed arcs. A PN is said to be self-loop free if 8p 2 P, t 2 T t2 p implies t 6 2 p . Ordinary nets are PNs whose arcs have weight 1. The incidence matrix of a PN is defined as C = Post À Pre.
A vector m 2 Z jPj 50 that assigns a non-negative integer to each place is called marking vector or marking. Two transitions t, t 0 are said to be in structural conflict if they share, at least, one input place, i.e. t\ t 0 6 ¼˘. Two transitions t, t 0 are said to be in effective conflict for a marking m if they are in structural conflict and they are both enabled at m. Two transitions t, t 0 are in equal conflict if Pre( Á , t) = Pre( Á , t 0 ) 6 ¼ 0, where 0 is a vector with all entries equal to zero.
A transition t is live if it can be fired from every reachable marking. A marked PN S is live when every transition is live. In this article, we assume that Ss we work with are live. A p-semiflow is a non-negative integer vector y50 such that it is a left anuller of the net's incidence matrix, y > Á C = 0. In the sequel, we omit the transpose symbol in the matrices and vectors for clarity. A p-semiflow implies a token conservation law independent from any firing of transitions. A t-semiflow is a non-negative integer vector x50 such that it is a right anuller of the net's incidence matrix, C Á x = 0. A support of a vector v is defined as v k k = fijv(i) 6 ¼ 0g. A p-(or t-)semiflow v is minimal when its support is not a proper superset of the support of any other p-(or t-)semiflow, and the greatest common divisor of its elements is one. A PN is said to be conservative (consistent) if there exists a p-semiflow (t-semiflow) that contains all places (transitions) in its support.
A PN is said to be strongly connected if there is a directed path joining any pair of nodes of the net structure. A state machine is a particular type of ordinary PN where each transition has exactly one input arc and exactly one output arc, that is, jt j = j tj = 1, 8t 2 T. In this article, we deal with PNs that model systems where resources are shared. Examples of this kind of system can be found in manufacturing, logistics, or web services systems. In general, these systems represent real-life problems where some items are processed and require the use of different resources (which are shared) during its processing. These systems can be naturally modelled in terms of process PNs, a subclass of PN whose inner structure is a strongly connected state machine. More formally: Definition 3.
5
A process PN (PPN) is a strongly connected self-loop free PN N = hP, T, Pre, Posti where:
is a partition such that P 0 = fp 0 g is the process-idle place, P S 6 ¼˘is the set of process-activity places and P R = fr 1 , . . . , r n g, n . 0 is the set of resources places; 2. the subnet N 0 = hP 0 [ P S , T, Pre, Posti is a strongly connected state machine, such that every cycle contains p 0 ; 3. for each r 2 P R , there exist a unique minimal psemiflow associated to r, y r 2 N jPj , fulfilling: y r k k \ P R = frg, y r k k \ P S 6 ¼˘, y r k k \ P 0 =ȃ nd y r (r) = 1. This establishes how each resource is reused, that is, they cannot be created nor destroyed;
ÞThis implies that every place p 2 P S belongs to the p-semiflow of at least one resource.
Definition 3 implies that PPNs are conservative and consistent. Intuitively, Definition 3 establishes a kind of net where there is a process using different shared resources, every place in the net is covered by some psemiflow and it uses some (at least one) resource, the number of instances of each resource remains constant and resources cannot change its type.
Let N = hP, T, Pre, Posti be a PPN. A vector m 0 2 Z jPj 50 is called acceptable initial marking 5 of N if: (1) m 0 (p)51, p 2 P 0 ; (2) m 0 (p) = 0, 8p 2 P S ; and (3) m 0 (r)5y r (r), 8r 2 P R , where m 0 (r) is the capacity, i.e. number of items, of the resource r, and y r is the unique minimal p-semiflow associated to r.
Definition 4.
A process PN system, or marked process PN S = hN , m 0 i, is a process PN N with an acceptable initial marking m 0 .
Timed PNs
In order to be able to use PNs for systems performance evaluation, the inclusion of the notion of time must be considered. There are two ways of introducing the notion of time in PNs, either in places or transitions. Since transitions are representing the actions of a system, which have associated some duration, we associate such a duration to the firing delay of transitions. 19 Besides, we consider that the firing delays of transitions follow an exponential distribution function.
A PN model where a set of exponential rates is considered (one for each transition in the model) is called a stochastic PN (SPN) model. 20, 21 These rates characterise the probability distribution function of the transition delay, which follow an exponential distribution function and are obtained as the inverse of the mean. These rates are considered to be marking-independent, i.e. its values are constant.
In this article, we consider that the average service time of a transition t can be zero, i.e. it fires in zero units of time. These transitions are called immediate transitions. Otherwise, transition t is a timed transition. The exponential transitions are graphically represented by a white box, while immediate transitions are black boxes. It will be assumed that all transitions in conflict are immediate. An immediate transition t in conflict will fire with probability
where A is the set of enabled immediate transitions in conflict and r(t) 2 N . 0 is the routing rate associated to transition t. The firing of immediate transitions consumes no time. When a timed transition becomes enabled, it fires following an exponential distribution with mean d(t). More formally, we will consider the following timed PN classes.
Definition 5.
A SPN 20 system is a pair hS, d, ri where S = hP, T, Pre, Post, m 0 i is a PN system, d 2 R jTj 50 is a positive real function such that d(t) is the mean of the exponential firing time distribution associated to transition t 2 T and r 2 N jTj . 0 is the vector of routing rates associated to transitions.
Definition 6.
A stochastic marked graph (SMG) is a SPN whose underlying PN is a marked graph.
Definition 7.
A stochastic process PN (SPPN) system is a SPN system whose underlying PN is a process PN.
There exist different semantics for the firing of transitions, being infinite and finite server semantics the most frequently used. Given that infinite server semantics is more general (finite server semantics can be simulated by adding self-loop places), we will assume that the timed transitions work under infinite server semantics.
The average marking vector, m, in an ergodic 22 PN system is defined as
where m(p) u is the marking of place p at time u and the notation = AS means equal almost surely. Similarly, the steady-state throughput, X , in an ergodic PN is defined as 23
where s(t) t is the firing count of transition t at time t. By definition, all the places of a SPPN are covered by p-semiflows, and therefore it is structurally bounded. In this work, we will assume that the SPPN under study is a live and structurally bounded net with freely related T-semiflows (i.e. a FRT-net). 24 It is known that the Markov process that describes the time evolution 21 of these nets is ergodic, 24 i.e. when the observation period tends to infinite, the estimated values of average marking and steady-state throughput tend to a certain value, what implies the existence of the above limits.
The vector of visit ratios expresses the relative throughput of transitions in the steady state. The visit ratio v(t) of each transition t 2 T normalised for transition t i , v t i (t), is expressed as
where G(t i ) = 1 X (t i ) represents the average inter-firing time of transition t i .
The visit ratios of two different transitions t, t 0 in equal conflict must be proportional to the corresponding routing rate r(t), r(t 0 ) defining the conflict resolution
. This condition can be also written in vector form as
where R is a matrix containing as many rows as pairs of transitions in equal conflict. In FRT-nets, the vector of visit ratios v exclusively depends on the structure of the net and on the routing rates. 24 The vector of visit ratios v normalised for transition t i , v t i , can be calculated by solving the following linear system of equations
Performance estimation. A lower bound for the average inter-firing time of transition t i , G lb (t i ), can be computed by solving the following LP problem (LPP)
where G(t i ) is the average interfiring time of transition t i and D t i is the vector of average service demands of transitions,
(the vector of visit ratios v t i is normalised for transition t i ) (In the sequel, we omit the superindex t i in D t i for clarity). As a side product of the solution of equation (6), y represents the slowest p-semiflow of the system, thus LPP equation (6) can also be seen as a search for the most constraining p-semiflow. This p-semiflow will be the one with highest ratio
Therefore, an upper bound Y(t i ) for the steady-state throughput can be calculated as the inverse of the lower bound for the average inter-firing time
Let us recall that the vector of average service times of transitions d does not depend on the marking. Otherwise, LPP equation (6) could not be applied, basically because having a d depending on the marking will lead to a non-linear programming problem.
Compositional PN models for fault tolerance
In this section, we provide compositional PN-based models for the FT techniques based on the basic concepts of FT given in 'Fault tolerance'. Recall that a FT technique may involve both error detection -concurrent or preemptive -and recovery phases -divided in error handling (rollback, rollforward or compensation) and fault handling (diagnosis, isolation, reconfiguration or reinitialisation).
Consider we have a system modelled with a PN in which there is an activity (represented by a timed transition T f ) that is subject to fail. We called it a faulty transition, as it may lead to a fault. Before adding any FT technique to the system, we apply a transformation rule T R in the PN. This transformation rule allows us to apply our approach in general case, and it is not modifying the behaviour of the original PN model anyhow. Figure 3 shows how this transformation rule T R works: an immediate transition t(t 0 ) and place T f (T f ) are added just from(to) transition T f , and all input(output) places of transition T f are accordingly connected to transition t(t 0 ). Figure 4 depicts the interaction between a PN that models the behaviour of a given system and a PN that models a FT technique. A PN-based FT model is subdivided in Error Detection and Recovery sub-models. Each sub-model, respectively, represents the phases involved in a FT technique. In the sequel, we explain each model and its interactions in detail. Figure 5 (a) depicts the PN model for error detection. The timed transition T detect represents how long the error detection activity takes. Note that this transition is abstracting the behaviour for detecting an error, so that it may be refined into a more complex model representing error detection in more detail (Detection phase in Figure 5(a) ). After error detection activity takes place, the presence of an error is discriminated. When an error arises (transition t err ), then a token is put on place pj eed . Otherwise, a token is put on place pj ned .
PN error detection model
The integration between the error detection model and the system model is done through labelled places pj sed , pj eed (a labelled place p is defined as pj label ). We have followed the compositional rules over the places defined in Donatelli and Franceschinis 25 and Bernardi et al. 26 to combine models using labelled places: pairs of places with matching labels are superposed. Figure 5 (a) depicts the places pj sed , pj ned added to the system model. The origin of the incoming arc of place pj sed depends on the type of error detection, and synchronises the execution of the error detection model with the system model: when concurrent, the arc added is the dashed one; otherwise (preemptive), the dotted arc is considered. Note that the place pj ned is synchronised with T f (which is added to the system by transformation rule T R).
This simple model allows us to represent the most common error detection techniques, e.g. to validate input data, or intermediate data generated and reused during faulty transition (it can be concurrently done), and to validate output after faulty transition execution (preemptive).
PN recovery model
The recovery phase involves two steps, a first (optional) step of error handling (rollback, rollforward or compensation) and a second one of fault handling technique (diagnosis, isolation, reconfiguration or reinitialisation).
Following the definitions given in Avizienis et al., 2 we have grouped the fault handling techniques in two groups: diagnosis and reinitialisation techniques; and isolation and reconfiguration. This decision is based on the abstracted behaviour of these techniques, as we explain henceforward. We have composed models that represent valid combinations of the recovery phase as it is shown in Table 1 . This classification is made based on how the techniques work. For instance, we believe that a rollforward technnique cannot be combined with reconfiguration or reinitialisation, because reconfiguration switches the request to spare components, while reinitialisation updates and records a new system configuration. Thus, we consider that to move to a future correct state after recovering is unmeaning. Figure 6 (a) shows the PN model of diagnosis and reinitialisation FT recovery techniques. Place pj eed is superposed with the one of Error Detection model, and place pj T f is superposed with place T f in the system model. A token in place pj eed indicates that an error has been detected. Once transition t rm is fired, a (optional) compensation activity may take place (Compensation phase). Then, recovery activity takes place (abstracted in Recovery phase). As in the previous model of error detection, we have represented compensation and recovery phases as a single timed transitions (T c and T rec , respectively). These transitions may be refined into more complex models representing compensation and recovery activities in more detail.
Finally, the token flow is redirected through place pj rtn . The superposition of this place depends on the error handling technique used: it will be a place that becomes eventually marked after the faulty transition T f is fired (rollforward), or which was eventually marked before its firing (rollback). In both cases and to keep conservativeness of the model, place pj rtn must belong to the p-semiflow associated to the resource r (we called it faulty resource), being r the inner resource used by faulty activity. Although a transition T f can represent an activity where several resources are being used, for the sake of simplicity in this article we assume that the fault is caused by the use of the inner resource (i.e. the last one acquired). Otherwise, note that after the recovering phase other resources acquired after the faulty resource should be released to keep conservativeness.
The difference between diagnosis and reinitialisation techniques can be established by the duration of the recovery phase. For instance, when the diagnosis technique is considered, the recovery phase will have a much lower duration than when reinitialisation is taken into account owing to the actions that are performed. Figure 6 (b) shows the PN model of isolation and reconfiguration FT recovery techniques. This case is identical to the previous until the (optional) compensation phase. After the compensation phase takes place, the type of the fault is discriminated 2 as intermittent (that is, the fault is transient) or solid (i.e. the faults whose activation is reproducible). When the fault is intermittent, as proposed in Avizienis, 2 normal execution can keep going on and token is returned to place pj rtn (as before, the superposed place depends on the type of error detection). On the contrary, when a solid fault is detected, the faulty resource is excluded from normal service delivery -as indicated by both isolation and reconfiguration techniques -and the token is moved to the place pj safe . We assume that place pj safe is superposed with the place previous to acquire the faulty resource r, i.e. pj safe = t acq , where t acq is the transition where the faulty resource r is acquired.
In the case of isolation and reconfiguration, the recovery phase is called the maintenance phase, because it involves the participation of an external agent. 2 We have modelled the maintenance phase as a single transition T MTTR that represents the mean time to repair (MTTR) spent on fixing the faulty resource. As in the previous case, this model can be refined to a more complex maintenance model. Anyhow, after the maintenance phase takes place, the fixed resource is returned to place pj ir , which is superposed to the resource place p r .
As in the previous techniques, the difference between isolation and reconfiguration technique can be established by the duration of the maintenance phase. For instance, when an isolation technique is considered, the maintenance phase will have a much greater duration than when reconfiguration is taken into account.
Finally, note that most of the FT techniques can be modelled with the proposed models. For instance, a watchdog can be modelled as a reconfiguration FT 
The symbol Ã means optional. technique with concurrent error detection and rollforward (or rollback), and a checkpointing and rollback can be modelled as a reinitialisation FT technique. Unfortunately, other FT techniques, such as n-version programming or combined proactive-reactive techniques 27 cannot be adapted to the proposed model and some tweaks must be done. We aim to extend these models to cover all FT techniques as a future work.
Recall the PN of the running example depicted in Figure 1 . Suppose that the filtering activity may fail, i.e. the faulty transition is T 7 . The router manufacturer is interested in adding a watchdog (recall it can be modelled as a reconfiguration FT technique) into the algorithm such that the threads that fail (they are hanged) are discarded, and they are cleaned with a fixed internal timer. In this case, the error detection model is concurrent, as the failure can be detected during normal operation; and the error handling technique used is rollback: when an error is detected, the packet is filtered by another thread, when available.
The resulting PN, after adding the FT technique described above, is depicted in Figure 7 . We assume that the detection activity takes, on average, d detect = 0:5 ms, and the recovery activity takes, on average, d MTTR = 2 s. Let us suppose a probability of raising an error of 0:2, resulting the 5% of the times in a solid fault. This PN will be used in the next section for sensitive performability analysis.
Analysis of PN-based FT models
This section introduces, in the first place, how the conservative components (i.e. the p-semiflows) are modified when FT models are added to a PPN. Then, we perform a sensitive analysis on upper throughput bound of the PPN system with respect to the failure probabilities. Lastly, we propose an optimisation technique that tries to compensate the throughput degradation produced by the existence of faults.
Conservative components
Let us analyse how minimal p-semiflows are modified. The addition of the proposed FT models transforms each p-semiflow y r associated to a resource r that makes use of the faulty transition t f (i.e. y r k k \ f t f , t f g 6 ¼˘) into two p-semiflows y k k. This transformation is owing to the fact that FT models consume/produce tokens from/to the original p-semiflows. These p-semiflows cover all places added by the FT technique, thus the net remains conservative.
For instance, the minimal initial p-semiflows of the net in Figure 1 are: y 1 = fp 0 , p 1 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 j safe , p 8 j rtn , p 9 , p 10 , p 11 g, y 2 = fp 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 j safe , p 8 j rtn , p 9 , p 10 , p 11 g and y 3 = fp 7 j ir , p 8 j rtn , p 9 g. The minimal p-semiflows of the PN in Figure 1 that contain places from/to transition T 7 (p 8 j rtn and p 9 , respectively) are y 1 ,y 2 and y 3 . Thus, the new p-semiflows of the PN in Figure 7 are the ones showed in Table 2 .
Note that these new p-semiflows violate the third property of definition of PPN (see 'Preliminary concepts'), given that there exist more than a single minimal p-semiflow containing the same resource, e.g. y 0 2 and y 00 2 contain the resource place p 2 on its support. Nevertheless, in the new net system it still holds that each minimal p-semiflow contains only one initially marked place.
Sensitive analysis of upper throughput bounds
As we have seen in the previous section, the p-semiflows of the PPN change once some of the proposal FT models are added. Recall that an upper throughput bound Y of a PPN system is related to the slowest p-semiflow y, that is
Given that in the considered nets all the components of minimal p-semiflows are equal to 1 and the only initially marked places are resource places, i.e. 8p 2 y r k knfrg, m 0 (p) = 0, the previous equation can be written as
where y r is minimal. Let us assume that after adding some FT techniques, there are n minimal p-semiflows, y 1 , . . . , y n that are modified. Thus, the throughput bound of the new net system is
where y i is a minimal p-semiflow, i.e. 8p 2 y k k, y(p) = 1. Recall the running example of the previous section. Suppose an initial marking of nP = 10, nT = 2 and nS = 2. The slowest p-semiflow is, with this configuration and before adding the FT technique (Figure 1 ), y = fp 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 j safe , p 8 j rtn , p 9 , p 10 , p 11 g; and the upper throughput bound is Y = 0:470588. After adding the proposed FT technique, the equation
Note that as error detection is concurrent, there is no p-semiflow containing both faulty transition and error detection transition at the same time. Otherwise, the faulty transition appears in conjunction with error detection transition in all p-semiflows generated. Besides, in the case of concurrent error detection, the number of minimal p-semiflows to be checked can be simplified, taking only the generated one that it is max(d detect , d T f ). Thus, the p-semiflows of interest here are: y The findings show that Y 2 is a bit lower than the original upper throughput bound for low probabilities of error. This holds until the probability of error reaches a value near to 0:14. From that point, Y 3 becomes the new upper throughput bound, which besides exponentially decreases. It is remarkable that y 0 3 , i.e. the p-semiflow associated to Y 3 , is even faster than the others for low probabilities of error (r e \ 0:06). Lastly, when the probability of error reaches a value near to 0:8, the throughput of all minimal p-semiflows quickly decreases and tends to zero.
Resource assignment
This section introduces an iterative strategy that computes the number of resources needed to maintain a given upper throughput bound in a degradable system where our proposed FT models are added. Table 2 . New p-semiflows of the PN in Figure 7 .
Such a strategy is presented in Algorithm 1. As input, it needs the description of the PN model with the FT techniques added to it with the initial marking and the vector of service times of transitions, hN , m 0 , di; the upper throughput bound Y before adding the FT techniques; and the set Y FT of minimal p-semiflows that are modified after adding the FT techniques. As output, it returns the initial marking m 0 0 such that the upper throughput bound Y 0 of the FT system is greater than or equal to Y.
Algorithm 1.
An iterative algorithm to compute initial marking needed to maintain a certain upper throughput bound with a probability of error. That is, it needs another thread and two more filtering-threads to compensate 20% of errors (and 5% of them deriving in solid faults) using reconfiguration as FT technique.
We have plotted in Figure 8 (b) the initial marking needed to support the given throughput of Y = 0:470588 varying the probability of error r e , r e 2 ½0 . . . 1, taking steps of 0:01. The dotted line is the initial number of tokens of p 0 (packets, nP), the solid line corresponds to the initial number of tokens of p 2 (threads, nT) and the dashed line is the initial number of tokens of p 7 (filtering-threads, nS). The results show that the number of packets and threads remain more or less equal, i.e. there is no need to increment too many units to be able to maintain the given throughput, even with a high probability of errors. However, the number of filtering-threads needed increases rapidly with respect to the probability of error.
Minimising cost of compensating throughput degradation
In this section, we present an ILPP that minimises the cost of compensating throughput degradation caused by the presence of errors.
We are able to compute the initial marking needed to maintain a given throughput with the previous Algorithm 1. However, the increment of items of resources can have a cost in real systems and we may not be able to increment as much as is desired. Recall that equation
relates not only the number of items of resources (m 0 (r i )), but also activity timings and error (and solid faults) probabilities (D). If we consider a given error probability r e and solid faults probability r s , a compensation may be done in two ways: either the number of resources in the system can be incremented, or the timing of FT activities (detection, compensation and recovery phases) can be decremented. Both ways can have some cost associated.
Let us assume that FT phases are abstracted in a single-timed transition, i.e. a FT technique j adds to the system three-timed transition: T We can build an ILPP to compute the minimum cost that guarantees a compensation of the throughput system after adding a number m of FT techniques as
where n p-semiflows have been modified by the addition of m FT techniques to the original system; Case study: a secure database system
This section introduces a case study to test our approach. We have considered the design of a secure database system (SDBS) deployed as a web service that stores confidential data and keeps traceability of all operations made over the data. Examples of this kind of system are a medical insurance company (that keeps customer's medical data), or a bank company (that keeps customer's balance accounts).
The UML-sequence diagram in Figure 9 models how a SDBS works when a user requests an operation on its stored data (for instance, a bank customer asks for all operations made on its bank accounts). When a new request arrives at the system (attended by WSRequester), it asks for a security token that is provided by WS-SecurityToken. Once it is provided, the request is accordingly encrypted and set to WS-Policyservice, where it is validated, decrypted and transmitted to WSCoordinator. Finally, WS-Coordinator unpacks the request and sends it to the WS-Application, which accesses the database through WS-DBApplication service via a secure intranet. An acknowledgement is sent back through the system to the origin of the request, reporting the results to the user. Note that the result also needs a security token to be securely transmitted back to the user. Figure 10 depicts the PN corresponding to the behaviour of the SDBS system described in Figure 9 . The transformation from UML to PN is documented inDistefano et al., 28 and can be carried out by several tools, such as ArgoPN, ArgoPerformance 28 or ArgoSPE. 29 Each resource is represented by a dark grey place in the PN: p 2 (WS-Requester), p 5 (WS-Policyservice), p 13 (WS-SecurityToken), p 24 (WS-Coordinator), p 29 (WS-Application) and p 32 (WS-DBApplication); while user's requests are represented by the process-idle place p 0 (depicted in light grey). As the running example, we consider that there is a place p 0 0 with the same initial marking that p 0 , thus it becomes implicit and it is not considered for the analysis (indeed, we omitted it in Figure 10 ). Table 3 (a) summarises the activity times of the transitions in the PN depicted in Figure 10 and the corresponding methods in UML-Sequence Diagram depicted in Figure 9 . Owing to the state explosion problem the computation of the number of states with this configuration using different tools (e.g. PeabraiN 30 or GreatSPN 31 ) has not been possible in a reasonable time in a Intel Pentium IV 3:6 GHz with 3 GiB RAM DDR2 533 MHz host machine. The acquire (release) of a resource is represented by an immediate transition with an input (output) arc. For example, transition t 2 represents the reception of the request by the WS-Requester service, while t 7 represents the release of such a resource.
Consider that the transition that represents an operation on data after reading the DB, T 31 , may fail with a probability of 0:15. We decide to add a reinitialisation FT technique FT 1 , without the compensation phase and with a concurrent error detection that takes, on average, d(T The upper throughput bound of the system is, before adding the FT technique, Y = 1:481481, and it is associated to the minimal p-semiflow of p 32 , i.e. WSDBApplication. When adding the FT technique described, the minimal p-semiflows that are modified correspond to the ones that use T 31 , i.e. y p 0 , y p 2 , y p 29 and y p 32 , and the upper throughput bound decreases near to a 133:98%, that is, Y 0 = 0:633147 and it is related as well to WS-DBApplication. Let us apply now Algorithm 1 to compute the initial marking needed to compensate the throughput degradation. The minimal p-semiflows under study here are y That is, the number of WS-Application (p 29 ) and WSDBApplication (p 31 ) must be incremented to 11 and 10 units, respectively, to maintain the given throughput of Y=1:481481 and a probability of error of 0:15. If resources are incremented as it is given by the solution of this algorithm, the new upper throughput bound has a value of Y 0 =1:567476. Let us consider that the addition of new resources has some associated cost, more precisely, the cost of adding new instances of any host service is $350 each (for instance, because new licenses for deploying more virtual servers must be purchased). In the case of the recovery method, it can be improved having a cost, on average, of $250/ms, and the minimum required time for recovering is 5 ms (i.e. d min (T rec ) = 5 ms).
With this configuration, we apply now the proposal ILPP (9) for computing the minimal cost that compensates a probability of error of 0:15. The result of applying ILPP (9) is that four more resources of WSApplication (p 29 ), five more resources of WSDBApplication (p 32 ) and recovery time must be decremented in 2 ms. The cost associated to these actions is $3650. After applying these changes, the upper throughput bound is Y 00 = 1:500441, which represents an improvement near to 1:28% of the previous upper throughput bound Y.
Note that as the number of resources and the timing must be natural numbers, we will always obtain an upper throughput bound in the FT system where results of ILPP (9) are applied (slightly) better than in the original system model. In summary, the solution of Algorithm 1 has an associated cost of $3850, because 11 more resources must be added, while the solution giving by minimising cost through ILPP (9) costs $3650. 
Conclusions
Software systems are usually subject to faults that may lead to the existence of error and failures. Normally, FT techniques are incorporated to these systems (then called FT systems) to mitigate the impact of activations of faults. FT systems can be naturally modelled as discrete event systems where sharing resources are used.
In this article, first we have provided compositional models for FT techniques that allow us to make performability ( i.e. performance under failure conditions) analysis easier when FT parameters change. Thus, these FT models can be useful for evaluating different FT approaches in the same system model. Second, we have presented an iterative algorithm that computes the initial marking needed to maintain a given upper throughput bound in a system model within our proposed FT models. Third, we present an ILPP that minimises the cost of compensating throughput degradation caused by the presence of faults and errors. The use of linear programming techniques guarantees its efficiency and scalability to large models. Both algorithms are applied to a process PN modelling a secure database system.
This article provides upper throughput bounds, which are usually closer to the real system throughput. 24, 32 As future work, we aim at analysing lower throughput bounds following the same methodology. The lower throughput bounds would enhance the throughput analysis under failure, as an interval for the throughput would be provided.
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